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EDUCATION FUNDING AND THE ALABAMA EXAMPLE: 
ANOTHER PLAYER ON A CROWDED FIELD 
John Herbert Roth* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If the fundamental task of the school is to prepare children 
for life, the curriculum must be as wide as life itself. It should 
be thought of as comprising all the activities and the 
experiences afforded by the community through the school, 
whereby the children may be prepared to participate in the life 
of the community.' 
During the birth of the United States, when the many 
notable proponents of a system of free public education in this 
nation envisioned the benefits of an educated multitude, it is 
doubtful that they could have conceived of the free public 
school system that has become today's reality. Although it is 
manifest that an educated citizenry is an objective of the 
utmost importance in any organized and civilized society, the 
debate concerning how to provide for and fund a system of free 
public education has continued with little repose. 2 Yet, in spite 
of continued debate and political rhetoric concerning better 
• Associate Attorney, Capell & Howard, P.C., Montgomery, Alabama. LL.M. 
Candidate (Taxation), New York University, 2003; J.D., magna cum laude, Samford 
University, 2002; M.A. (Banking and Finance), University of Alabama, 1999; B.S. 
(Finance), Auburn University, 1998. I wish to thank my mother, Laura J. Roth, a 
recently retired twenty-five-year veteran of the Montgomery County, Alabama, public 
school system, for providing me insight into the pitfalls of inadequate education 
funding. Also, I wish to thank two of my law professors, Gov. Albert P. Brewer for 
offering his expertise on the Alabama state constitution, and Donald B. Sweeney, Jr. 
for introducing me to the eccentricities of public school law. 
1. Edgar G. Johnston & Roland C. Faunce, Student Activities in Secondary 
Schools 7 (Ronald Press Co. 1 952). 
2. See Michael Heise, Equa.l Educational Opportunity Hollow Victories, and the 
Demise of School Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective and Alternative 
Explanation, 32 Ga. L. Rev. 543 (1998); ,John Dayton, When All Else Has Failed: 
Resol{!ing the School Funding Problem, 1995 BYU Educ. & L.J. 1 (1995); James E. 
Ryan, The lnflu.ence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 432 (1999). 
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schools for the future, the plight of education funding in many 
jurisdictions has remained unaltered from year to year, and 
thus, from generation to generation. The resulting status quo 
of this educational inadequacy has been to some, in one form or 
another, the main culprit in deepening the almost abysmal 
chasm between opportunity and sustained misery 
commensurate with a proper education or the lack thereof. 
Furthermore, if this status quo remains unchanged, many 
states will doubtless relegate many more future generations 
unable to rely on the vehicle which the proponents of public 
education dreamed would allow the less fortunate to break the 
bondage of illiteracy, political passivity, and poverty that free 
public education was meant to extinguish. Unfortunately, 
however persuasive the motivation to demand more attention 
to and better funding for public education may be, little has 
changed in some states where governments are still struggling 
to provide the desperately needed funds that are a minimum 
requisite to an effective education system. 
The state of Alabama is but one example of a state facing a 
shortage of funds for education purposes, 3 although more states 
are likely to experience similar funding scarcities as national 
and international economies experience cyclical downturns in 
the natural business cycle, 4 as is the case currently. In recent 
years, the plight of public school education funding in Alabama 
has been a constant fixture in news reports across the state5 
and nation.6 Stories regarding inadequate public school 
3. "First, there is the broken septic tank. If the Wilcox County school is to open 
for classes in three weeks, the tank must be fixed to meet health codes. Right now, 
there's no money to do it. There isn't money for a librarian or a physical education 
teacher or a full-time counselor, either. There isn't money for field trips. There isn't 
money to combat the termites eating the library books. There just isn't any money." 
Jim Yardley, Seeking Fairness for Schools, Alabama Advocates Go to Court, Atlanta J. 
& Canst. F5 (Aug. 3, 1992); but see Bob Johnson, Census Shows Quality of Life Up in 
Alabama, Chattanooga Times/Chattanooga Free Press 135 (May 25, 2002) (comparison 
of the 2000 census against the 1990 census shows that more Alabamians are receiving 
higher income and more education). 
4. "State economists are still compiling the bad news, but it is clear that revenue 
shortfalls are so serious that almost every school system will suffer cuts." Thomas 
Hargrove, Recession Hits State Budgets-and School.9--NaUonwide, Albuquerque Trib. 
(Nov. 28, 200 1) (available at <http://www .abqtrib.com/archives/newsO 11 
11280 1_news_budgets.shtml> ). 
5. Editor, In Addressing Funding Issues, Montgomery Advertiser A8 (Nov. 29, 
2002); Peggy Ussery, Richardson: Education Key to Stronr; Economy, Dothan Eagle 1, 6 
(May 14, 2002). 
6. Editor, The Lotto Loses in Alabama, Chi. Trib. C20 (Oct. 17, 1999) ("Fairly or 
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financing in Alabama span the spectrum from equity funding 7 
to the failed attempt at instituting a state lottery8 that was 
proffered to rectifY the inequitable and inadequate reality that 
exists in Alabama's state education system today. 9 Many of 
these problems arise from the system of local taxation of 
property that funds local school districts in the state, 10 yet the 
not, Alabama is usually considered one of the more backward of the 50 United States, a 
laggard in social attitudes, economics and education."); Dana Beyerle, Alabama: 
Raising a School Tax. N.Y. Times Al6 (July 23, 2002); Jim Yardley, Seeking Fairness 
for Schools, Alabama Aduocates Go to Court, Atlanta J. & Const. F5 (Aug. 3, 1992). 
7. William Celis, Parents Sue Alabama Ouer School Financing, N.Y. Times 11 
(Jan. 19, 1991); Martha I. Morgan eta!., Establishing Education Program Inadequacy: 
ThP Alabama Example, 28 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 559 (1995); Jeffrey D. Dyess, 
Comment, A Mandate to the Legislature or Serious Judicial Intervention? A Remedy in 
the Alabama Public School Equity Funding Case, 25 Cumb. L. Rev. 133 (1994); Carolyn 
J. Campbell & Sharon M. P. Nicholls, Public School System Violates the Education, 
Equal Protection, and Due Process Clauses of the Alabama Constitution by Failing to 
Prooide Equitable and Adequate Educational Opportunities and by Failing to Prouide 
Appropriate Instruction and Special Seruices for Children with Disabilities, 4 fi.U. Pub. 
Int. LJ. 218 (1994) 
8. The Lotto Loses in Alabama, supra n. 6; Patricia Kathryn Carlton, Student 
Author, All Bets are Off: An Examination of Alabama's Proposed Lottery and the 
Educational Inadequacies It was Intended to Remedy, 51 Ala. L. Rev. 753, 753-54 
(2000) 
9. "Alabama is not unique in that financial support for public schools varies 
throughout the state. Other states have the same problem and a number of lawsuits 
are under way to rectify the situation. The problem is particularly acute in Alabama 
because nearly seventy percent of the financial support for public schools comes from 
the state." ,John C. Walden & Renee D. Culverhouse, School Finance Litigation in 
Alabama, 72 Educ. L. Rep. 691, 691-92 (1992) (footnote omitted). 
10. In the context of the equity funding debate, one commentator described the 
state of school funding in Alabama as follows: 
[T]he primary method of funding of the school systems involved is through 
the collection of local property taxes. The value, or basis, of the taxable 
property within any given district can vary widely throughout a state. Thus, 
the taxes collected and money spent per pupil reflects wide disparities in the 
level of education a district can afford to provide, regardless of the taxing 
effort within each district. 
Dyess, supra n. 7, at 136 (citations omitted). See also Randall D. Quarles, Student 
Author, Education in Alabama: Is There a Right to the Three R's?, 43 Ala. L. Rev. 133 
(1991) (stating that "the amount spent on a particular child's schooling depends largely 
on where his or her residence lies in relation to an arbitrary line-a county or 
municipal boundary"); H. C. Hudgins, Jr. & RichardS. Vacca, Law and Education 115 
(4th ed., Michie Co. 1995) (stating that the "'property tax dependence' has caused a 
certain unevenness of development throughout state educational systems .... "). 
Although beyond the particular scope of this article, it is important to note that, of 
the many problems with the outdated Alabama Constitution of 1901, the archaic 
provision for property taxes is one of main importance to public school funding. See 
GaiJ Collins, Alabama's Self-Inflicted Wounds; When the National Economy Takes a 
Dip, States With an Inherently Unfair Tax System Suffer First, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 
A21 (Mar. 21, 2001) (quoting Dr. David Bronner, head of the Retirement System of 
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problem is exacerbated by the health of the overall economy. 11 
In other words, as local and state government entities in 
Alabama face weakening economic conditions, one of the first 
casualties of diminished state coffers are Alabama's public 
schools. In particular, programs in public schools that are 
deemed "unnecessary" or "not fundamental" to a minimum 
proper education required under the law are often the first to 
succumb to the funding war that has become commonplace in a 
state where equality on many levels has only recently gained 
prommence. 
The focus of this article concerns only one particular area of 
the ongoing public school funding debate as it pertains to 
proposed programs that require students to pay fees 12 for 
participation in certain extracurricular activities that have 
played a traditionally vital role in the proper physical and 
mental development of school aged children for many 
generations. One particular example of such a fee charged to 
public school students today is referred to in education funding 
parlance as a "pay-to-play" fee. 13 A pay-to-play program is an 
alternative funding scheme14 whereby students in public 
schools must pay a fee to take part in certain educational and 
sports programs, including extracurricular activities such as 
football and band. 15 Thus, instead of terminating certain 
Alabama, as saying, "This is the most screwed-up tax system in America, bar none."); 
see Editor, Tax System Fails on Both Fronts, Montgomery Advertiser (Feb. 5, 2003) 
(discussing a survey of the country's tax system concluding that only Nevada's tax 
system is worse than Alabama's). Currently, although the ad valorem property tax is 
one of the principal sources of funding for public schools, Alabama's ad valorem tax is 
the lowest in the nation. Laura D. Chaney, Student Author, Alabama's Constitution-
A Royal Pain in the Tax: The State's Constitutionally Defective Tax System, 32 Cumb. 
L. Rev. 233, 245 (2001). See Lynn Hagewood Schuck, Student Author, Ad Valorem 
Taxation Exemption: An Evaluation of Alabama's Tax Exemption for Property Deuoted 
Exclusively to Charitable Pnrpose, 33 Cum b. L. Rev. 135 n.3, 5 (2002). 
11. See Editor, Alabama 2002 Teacher Raises Highly Unlikely, Chattanooga 
Times/Chattanooga Free Press B5 (Jan. 26, 2001) (economic downturn makes teacher 
pay raises difficult). 
12. Examples of such fees include "towel fees in physical education classes, 
breakage fees in chemistry classes, fees for band and cheerleader uniforms, typing 
class fees covering supplies, and others." Hudgins & Vacca, supra n. 10, at 164. 
13. See generally Marc D. Puntus, Education Fees in Public Schools: A 
Practitioner's Guide, 73 B.U. L. Rev. 71 (1993). 
14. Id. (stating that thirty one states concluded the 1991 fisc&! year with a budget 
deficit, and in order to remedy those results, states arc attempting various methods of 
raising needed funding). 
15. Extracurricular activities can be defined as activities "that are school-
sponsored but are not part of regular class activities or the basis for academic credit." 
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sports programs and other extracurricular activities due to 
inadequate funding, the school will essentially charge any 
participating student a fee in order to offset the cost to the 
school system. 16 But, in order to enable disadvantaged 
students to participate, some programs will include a waiver of 
the fee structure for those students who cannot afford to pay 
the fee. 17 
A pay-to-play program18 was considered recently by 
Alabama State Superintendent of Education Ed Richardson. 19 
In December of 2001 and again in March of 2003, Dr. 
Richardson20 proposed to deal with education funding cuts in 
Alabama by instituting a halt to sports and other 
extracurricular activities that are not self-funding, most 
notably, sports and music programs. Dr. Richardson's proposal 
was met with much criticism and discussion, 21 and to date, 
such a proposal has yet to be adopted by Alabama. However, if 
the Alabama state school board does determine that, due to 
inadequate funding, a pay-to-play program should be 
instituted, the board may need to consider22 whether such a 
Martha M. McCarthy & Nelda H. Cambron-McCabe, Public School Law 126 (3rd ed., 
Allyn & Bacon 1992). 
16. Other than the appropriateness of a pay-to-play program as it relates to 
violating a free school clause, another consideration not dealt with in this paper 
concerns which sports programs to cancel due to inadequate funding, without violating 
the provisions of Title IX and/or the IDEA. 
17. See Kelley v. E. Jackson Pub. Schs., 372 N.W.2d 638 (Mich. App. 1985) (for an 
example of a fee waiver system). 
18. Many examples of this type of program have surfaced over the years. See 
E.M. Swift, Why Johnny Can't Play: Because Athletic Budgets Haven't Kept Up with 
Costs, High School Sports Across the Nation Are Threatened, 75 Sports Illustrated 60 
(Sep. 23, 1991); ,John Valenti, Rocky Point Families Pay Price, N.Y. Newsday 163 (Sep. 
12, 1991); Gary Miles, Out of Money: Prep Sports Could Lose Budget Race, USA Today 
lC (July 30. 1991). 
19. See Mike Cason, Schools May Cut Sports, Band, The Montgomery Advertiser, 
Mar. 6, 2003; Editor, Richardson's Comments Draw Political Fire, The Associated Press 
Newswires (Dec. 9, 2001); Sunny David, Threat to Athletics Spurs School Tax Hike, 
Plan Appears to Pass in Mobile Area Vote, The Atlanta J. & Const. SA (May 16, 2001). 
20. Many commentators have praised Dr. Richardson for the improvements made 
in the Alabama school system since he took the reigns of the battered system. See 
Charles Mahtesian, Ed Richardson: Tough Grader, Governing Mag. 76 (Feb. 1997). 
With regards to cutting funding for extracurricular activities, Dr. Richardson was 
quoted as saying, '"You're not going to save any large sum of money (by cutting 
athletics). But you have no other place to go."' Cason, supra n. 19. 
21. ,Jamie Kizzire, School Closing Proposal Criticized, Birmingham Post-Herald 
(available at <http://www .geocities.com/dmmead/bir 121 O.html> ). 
22. If such a program is instituted, affected plaintiffs may challenge the program, 
but the challenge will likely have to be brought under a non-constitutional law theory 
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program is allowable under the current constitutional and 
statutory scheme of education laws23 in Alabama.24 Stated 
more narrowly, the board must consider whether such a 
program would violate the free education mandates found in 
the laws of Alabama. Then the board must determine whether 
sports programs and extracurricular activities are of such 
importance to the general school curricula that removal of the 
programs will, in essence, be tantamount to removing any 
number of essential subjects, such as math or science, that are 
fundamental to the proper education of school children. 25 
The Alabama situation may be viewed in two layers, one 
being the local legal structure, the other being the national 
economic climate. Momentarily leaving the particulars of the 
Alabama education structure and its attendant problems aside 
and viewing the Alabama situation amidst a national scope, 
the issue of extracurricular program funding in Alabama may 
seem, upon a cursory review, to be one of local concern to the 
citizens of Alabama. However, upon a closer examination, it is 
arguable that the problem in Alabama may well have its roots 
in its current legal structure, but it must be recognized that the 
problem is also affected by the nation's current recessionary 
economic condition. 
The purpose of this article is not simply to discuss the 
historical roots and legality of pay-to-play propositions in 
due to the holdings of the United States Supreme Court in Rodriquez. In Rodriquez, 
the Court held that "wealth discrimination alone does not merit strict scrutiny review;" 
and further, "the right to participate in extracurricular activities in public school 
cannot be a fundamental right under the Constitution because extracurricular 
activities are subsidiary to a primary education." Puntus, supra n. 13, at 74-75 (1993) 
(citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 ( 1973)). 
23. In order "to analyze the legal issues involving school fees the researcher must 
look to the constitution and statutes of each state." Hudgins & Vacca, supra n. 10, at 
164. 
24. Whether students in Alabama have a fundamental right to a free education in 
Alabama is not a new issue. See Quarles, supra n. 10 (concluding that the issue of 
whether education is a fundamental right is not clear). However, the analysis of a pay-
to-play program proposed by Dr. Richardson may be affected by the recent order from 
the Alabama Supreme Court arising from the equity funding cases. See Section 111-D, 
infra. 
25. It might be noted that actual determination of what programs are integral 
components of an adequate education could (and probably should) be left up to each 
local school district. As such, if an individual school district does not determine that 
certain extracurricular activities are important enough to qualify as being integral to 
the proper education of the children in that district, then those programs will not 
require funding by the state. See Section IV-D(3), infra. 
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Alabama, but to use the Alabama situation as one example of a 
problem that may well become more prevalent across the 
nation's public school systems as a result of the current 
economic downturn. 26 This article will not address the sources 
of the current downturn of our nation's economy, for that is 
better left to the many economists and talking heads that have 
become commonplace in news reports that flood mainstream 
America. Rather, this article will focus on the proverbial 
"difficult case," followed by the conclusion that when the 
economy experiences a downturn, some of the first victims may 
be the extracurricular programs that offer school children what 
is arguably a properly well-balanced education. 
II. PUBLIC EDUCATION LAW: IN GENERAL 
A. Free Education and the Federalist System of Local Control 
During the time before and after the American Revolution, 
there was a growing sentiment, especially in the American 
Colonies, that only an educated citizenry could constitute a 
legitimate democratic government.27 In fact, it has been noted 
that Thomas Jefferson, champion of public education, 
"conceived of education first and foremost as the sine qua non 
of a truly viable democracy, as the inescapable prerequisite to 
any intelligent popular rule."28 And, in his farewell address, 
George Washington, speaking to the people of the newly formed 
United States, encouraged the people to "[p]romote, then, as an 
object of primary importance, institutions for the general 
diffusion of know ledge. In proportion as the structure of a 
26. "Alabama is an excellent place to study, since its tax receipts are plummeting 
and its government is second to none in its inability to handle a crisis." Collins, supra 
n. 10, at A21 (editor claiming that she traveled to Alabama "to watch what happens in 
a state when the national economy turns south"). 
27. Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 131 (1995); see genera.lly, Martin D. Carcieri, Democracy and Education in 
the Thought of Jefferson and Madison, 26 ,J.L. & Educ. 1 (1997). However, the 
principle of a free public education was not born with the United States, but rather, 
"the principle of free elementary education is not of modern origin. Public schools were 
established for the education of the children of the community, in States which have 
long since perished .... " Elsberry v. Seay, 3 S. 804, 806 (Ala. 1887). 
28. Gordon C. Lee, Learning and Liberty: The Jeffersonian Tradition in 
Education, in Crusade Against Ignorance: Thomas Jefferson on Education I, 2 (Gordon 
C. Lee ed., William Byrd Press 1961). 
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government gives force of public opinion, it is essential that 
Ralph Waldo 
so eloquently 
public opinion be enlightened." 28 Finally, 
Emerson, in expressing the free school ideal, 
stated, 
We have already taken, at the planting of the 
Colonies ... the initial step, which for its importance 
might have been resisted as the most radical of 
revolutions, thus deciding at the start the destiny of this 
country, -this, namely, that the poor man, whom the 
law does not allow to take an ear of corn when starving, 
nor a pair of shoes for his freezing feet, is allowed to put 
his hand into the pocket of the rich, and say, You shall 
educate me, not as you will, but as I will; not alone in 
the elements, but, by further provisiOn, in the 
languages, in sciences, in the useful and in elegant 
arts. 30 
However, just as important as this idea of a free education 
was to the effectiveness of a democratic form of government in 
the eyes of the founding fathers, so too was the idea of 
federalism and leaving the province of education to the control 
of the states. Accordingly, the framers of the United States 
Constitution left to each individual state control over its 
education, evidenced by the lack of a provision in the 
Constitution regarding education. Pursuant to the Tenth 
Amendment,31 because the power of control over education was 
not delegated to the United States, it was reserved by the 
individual states. 32 Thus, the Constitution "placed the direct 
responsibility for establishing and maintaining public school 
systems in the hands of state governments."33 The only 
29. Kern Alexander & M. David Alexander, American Public School Law 24 (5th 
ed. 2001) (quoting Ellwood P. Cubberley, A Brief History of Education 288 (Houghton 
Mifflin Co. 1992)). 
30. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Education, in Educational Ideas in America: A 
Documentary History 176 (S. Alexander Rippa ed., David McKay Co. 1969). 
31. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 
U.S. Const. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment was introduced in order "to allay fears 
that the new national government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that 
the states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers." United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
32. Hudgins & Vacca, supra. n. 10, at 6 (stating that "there is no single, national 
public school system; rather, public education exists in fifty different state public school 
systems"); see also McCarthy & Cambron-McCabe, supra n. 15, at I. 
33. Hudgins & Vacca, supra n. 10, at 6. 
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limitation to the free reign over education that each state 
enjoys is that which is prohibited by the Constitution itself, 
most notably, the provisions for freedom of religion, equal 
protection, and similar fundamental rights protected by the 
Constitution. :i4 
This system of state and local control over the 
administration of public education cannot be overstated, 35 
especially in light of the instant issue, considering that it is 
within the power of the individual states to commandeer the 
course of their school systems according to the wishes and 
desires of the people within each state. It has often been said 
that the "state's authority over education is considered 
comparable to its powers to tax and to provide for the general 
welfare of its citizens."36 And like the power to tax and provide 
for the public welfare, "[t]he formation and governance of the 
public schools probably constitute the most important aspect of 
government used to improve the condition of humankind."37 
B. State Law Provisions for Public Education 
Because control over education was left to the states, nearly 
every state constitution has a clause containing a legislative 
directive for the establishment of education.38 And, it is up to 
3<1. "That the State may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the 
quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has 
certain fundamental rights which must be respected." Meyer v. Nebra.sko, 262 U.S. 
390, 40 I (1923). See McCarthy & Cambron-McCabe, supra. n. 15, at 1. 
35. "Without question, public education through a system of public schools is, by 
the Constitution, as well as by the statutes, a government function in Alabama; indeed 
a major activity of the state government." Willioms v. Stote, 161 S. 507 (Ala. 1935). 
36. McCarthy & Cambron-McCabe, supra n. 15, at 2. 
37. Alexander & Alexander, supra. n. 29, at 89. In similar regard, the United 
States Supreme Court also stated that "education is perhaps the most important 
function of state and local governments." Brown u. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 
(1954). 
38. Edward C. Bolmeier, The School in the Legol Structure, 88-89 (2d ed. W.H. 
Anderson Co. 1973). In discussing the nature of such constitutional provisions, 
Professors Alexander stated: 
Some state constitutions have very general provisions for education, 
requiring that a system of education be established and maintained, while 
others are more specific, including adjectives such as "free," "thorough and 
efficient," "uniform," "suitable," or "adequate." Such words are "terms of art" 
that, when interpreted by the courts, circumscribe the basis to which the 
legislature must conform in establishing a public school system. 
Alexander & Alexander, supra n. 29, at 30. In like manner, one commentator stated: 
Each education clause has its strengths and weaknesses; some are more 
precise and lengthy, while others are vague and short. Some education 
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the courts of each state "to interpret those clauses and to define 
their depth and breadth."39 The State of Alabama is no 
exception. In fact, the Supreme Court of Alabama stated that 
"courts may, should, and have involved themselves in defining 
the standards of a constitutionally mandated educational 
system."40 Therefore, in an attempt to properly determine 
what type of public education system is mandated in Alabama 
or any other state, one must first consider the seminal source of 
the state's education mandate, as well as amendments thereto 
and court decisions interpreting both. 41 In the case of 
Alabama, the legislative mandate arises from the Alabama 
Constitution of 1901, yet the history of amendments and case 
law after that time have resulted in a web of confusing twists 
and turns in a history riddled with explicit racism and 
attempts at reform. It is from this complexity of laws that 
proposed pay-to-play programs must be scrutinized. 
clauses seem to establish a clear quality of education, while others are void of 
any distinct qualitative phrases whatsoever. The absence, abundance, and 
variety of qualitative phrases in specific state constitutions is wide-ranging. 
Robert M. .JenRen, Advancing Education Through Education Clauses of State 
Constitutions, 1997 BYU Educ. & L.J. 1, 4 (1997). Finally, Dean Underwood stated 
that, in essence, the particular language of a state's education clause can be understood 
only with respect to that state's history and judicial interpretation: 
Education clauses vary widely by state .... Although some scholars have 
attempted to categorize state education clauses according to their 
language ... , such exercises are not particularly clear or useful. Education 
clauses, for the most part, defy categorization because they are peculiar to 
the state's constitutional history and its judiciary's own method of 
interpretation. State courts have used variously worded educational 
provisions to reach similar results, and state courts have used similarly 
worded educational provisions to reach different results. 
,Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U. Mich. ,J.L. Ref. 
493, 511-13 (1995) (footnotes omitted). See also William E. Thro, Student Author, To 
Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in Pubic School 
Finance Reform Litigation, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1639, 1661 n.103 (1989) (listing various state 
constitutional provisions). 
39. Jensen, supra n. 38, at 36. 
40. Opinion of the Justices, 624 S.2d 107, 154-55 (Ala. 1993) (citing Rose v. 
Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 210 (Ky. 1989)). But see Claremont Sch. Dist. 
v. Gov., 174 N.H. 499, 501 (N.H. 2002) (stating that "defining the parameters of the 
education mandated by the constitution is in the first instance for the legislature and 
the Governor"). 
11. Morgan et al., supra n. 7, at 564 (stating that an individual's own educational 
input standards "may be derived from at least three different sources: (1) the state's 
constitution, (2) the state's education statutes, and (3) the state's educational 
regulations and administrative policies"). 
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III. THE CURRENT CONDITION OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN ALABAMA 
A. Introduction 
To understand the current condition of public education in 
Alabama, the history and development of Alabama public 
education law is both enlightening and necessary. Included in 
this history is the Alabama Constitution of 1901 as well as the 
numerous cases that interpret its many provisions. However, 
after a thorough review of recent cases42 and the constantly 
changing form of the state constitution, it becomes evident that 
taking an accurate pulse of the status of Alabama public 
education for purposes of the instant issue is abstruse, at best. 
Accordingly, application of prior case law to the present state 
constitution is often instructive, but not necessarily controlling. 
In introducing the early history of public education in the 
State of Alabama, the Supreme Court of Alabama stated, 
The constitutions of 1819, 1861, and 1865, only declared 
generally that schools and the means of education shall 
forever be encouraged in this State. . . . The system of 
common schools, as they now exist in Alabama, 
originated while the constitution of 1819 was in force, 
and was founded on the grant of the sixteenth section in 
every township by the United States to the inhabitants 
of such townships for the use of schools, as provided by 
the act for the admission of the State into the Union. 43 
Since 1819, however, the status of public education m 
Alabama has been largely a result of the many years of 
attempts by the majority of the state to promote racism and 
inequality within the state. In particular, the Alabama 
Constitution of 1901 was the product of a decidedly white 
supremacist convention, as evidenced by the segregationist 
language of Alabama's public education clause.44 Further, the 
42. See Section HI-D, infra. 
43. Elsberry, 3 S. at 805. For a more complete history of educational provisions in 
Alabama, see Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 8.2d 107 (1993) (appendix including 
Ala. Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, Nos. CV-90-883-R, CV-91-{)117 (Ala. Cir. Ct. 
Apr. 1, 1993) (also available at 1993 WL 204083)). 
44. "Separate schools shall be provided for white and colored children, and no 
child of either race shall be permitted to attend a school of the other race." Ala. Const., 
Art. XIV, § 256 (1901, amended 1956). It is this fact, as well as many others, that 
drives proponents of state constitutional reform. 
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purpose of amending the 1901 public education clause in 195645 
was an attempt to avoid the mandate of school desegregation 
under the then impending Brown v. Board of Education 
decision. 46 
However, even after many successful years of control over 
the fate of public education by the supporters of racial 
inequality in the state, the status of public education in 
Alabama has arguably made a turn for the better due to a 
recent and protracted court battle. As a result of the equity 
funding case, it is now clear that every child in the state has a 
fundamental right to a free public education. But, even though 
this is the current state of the law, an overview of the 
development of the law during various stages of the state's 
history is still contributive to the determination of whether a 
pay-to-play program will be tolerated if instituted by local 
school boards in Alabama. 
B. Alabama Constitution of 1901: A Liberal Education47 
1. Section 256 
The Alabama Constitution of 1901 makes a specific, albeit 
vague, provision for the establishment of a public school system 
in Alabama in Section 256, which states, 
The legislature shall establish, organize, and maintain a 
liberal system of public schools throughout the state for 
the benefit of the children thereof between the ages of 
seven and twenty-one years. The public school fund 
shall be apportioned to the several counties in 
proportion to the number of school children of school age 
therein, and shall be apportioned to the schools in the 
districts or townships in the counties as to provide, as 
nearly as practicable, school terms of equal duration in 
such school districts or townships. Separate schools 
shall be provided for white and colored children, and no 
45. See id. 
46. Jay Murphy, Can Public Schools Be "Private''?, 7 Ala. L. Rev. 48, 64-73 
(1954). 
47. For a discussion on the precursors to educational provisions in the pre-1901 
constitution, see Quarles, supra n. 10, at 140-42. See also Opinion of the Justices No. 
338, 624 S.2d at 156-61 (stating, inter alia, that "education in this state has been a 
prominent theme in all of Alabama's constitutions"). 
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child of either race shall be permitted to attend a school 
of the other race. 48 
751 
The relevant language pertinent to the instant issue 
concerns the phrase "a liberal system of public schools." From 
this language, it is clear that the operative words in Alabama's 
constitutional provision for education are words of "quality," 
because they "emphasize the standard of quality ... for the 
state's school system."49 And, similar to the quality phrases 
found in over half of the country's state constitutions, 50 
Alabama's quality statement is not extremely helpful in 
establishing exactly what the constitution demands.51 Thus, 
judicial interpretation is of paramount importance to this 
determination. Again, it must be remembered that, as in the 
application of any judicial interpretation of statutory law, 
judicial interpretation of the 1901 education clause is 
appropriate only to the extent that the constitution and 
political forces have remained static. 
2. Bryant v. Whisenant 
In an early interpretation of Section 256, the Supreme 
Court of Alabama considered fees charged to students of the 
state's public school system shortly after the ratification of that 
section. In Bryant v. Whisenant, 52 the court upheld the 
imposition of an incidental fee to be paid by pupils in Calhoun 
County (with exemptions for indigent pupils). The court first 
noted that Alabama statutory law at the time "contemplate[d] 
that tuition shall be absolutely free to all minors of the state 
over the age of seven."53 However, the court found a "hard 
distinction" between charging students tuition and charging a 
reasonable incidental fee for things such as heating and 
lighting of classrooms. 54 Further, the court reasoned, where 
48. Ala. Const., Art. XIV, § 256 (1901, amended 1956) (emphasis added). It must 
be noted that, pursuant to Judge Reese's 1993 order, this provision has been modified 
in that the segregationist language has been determined to be void. See Section III-D, 
infra. 
49. Jensen, supra n. 38, at 4. 
50. ld. at 4-5. 
51. For a discussion of how other states interpret the terms "liberal" and 
"system," see Quarles, supra n. 10, at 160-62. 
52. 52 S. 525 (Ala. 1910). 
53. Id. at 525. 
54. Id. 
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there is no provision for the funding of such items, "the county 
boards have the right to prescribe a reasonable method for the 
raising and collection of this fund .... "55 
3. Vincent v. Board of Education 
The interpretation of Section 256 was also considered by 
the Supreme Court of Alabama in Vincent v. Board of 
Education in 1931.56 A father of two minor children challenged 
the constitutionality under Section 256 of a matriculation fee of 
$4.00 per student to be used by the local county or city board of 
education for library, laboratory, and shop work. 57 Mr. Vincent 
based his argument on the premise that Section 256 
established a system of free public schools. However, the court 
did not agree when it stated, 
It is quite evident that, if the framers of the 
Constitution had thought to impose upon the 
Legislature the duty to establish a system of free public 
schools, they would have used just that word. "Free" 
and "liberal" are by no means synonymous. They are 
both terms of varied meaning and application. 58 
In its rationale, the court pointed to the common definitions 
of the words free and liberal as found in Webster's New 
International Dictionary. The court stated that Webster's 
"defines a free school as a school where no charge is made for 
tuition."59 The court then noted that the term "liberal" has 
many meanings, but "[a]s applied to the public school 
system ... it intends a system as generous and bountiful as a 
just consideration of the limited power of taxation and the 
varied needs of the state will in reason justify."6° Further, 
"[t]his means that the schools shall be liberally maintained, 
that they should be open to common and general use," 61 and 
that it should be up to legislative discretion as to how the 
actual management of the schools should be effectuated. As 
55. ld. E.g., Kennedy v. Bd. of Educ., 107 S. 907 (Ala. 1926); Roberson v. Oliver, 
66 S. 645 (Ala. 1914); Williams v. Smith, 68 S. 323 (Ala. 1915); Ryan u. Sawyer, 70S. 
652 (Ala. 1916); Hughes v. Outlaw, 73 S. 16 (Ala. 1916). 
56. 131 S. 893 (Ala. 1931). 
57. ld. at 893. 
58. ld. at 894. 
59. I d. 
60. I d. 
61. I d. 
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such, the statute in question that allowed for schools to charge 
a matriculation fee was enacted, not in opposition to Section 
256, but in effectuating the purpose of Section 256.62 
Thus, it would seem from Vincent that the provision of 
Section 256 was meant to provide for as much education as 
possible, but free education itself is not mandated. Similar 
results were announced in Mitchell v. McCall, 63 where the 
court found that "the State of Alabama is under no 
constitutional obligation to provide public schools."64 
Therefore, under the original wording of Section 256, as well as 
by an analysis of the judicial interpretation of that provision 
prior to 1956, it was well settled before the 1990s that the 
imposition of fees upon students in public schools was not 
violative of Alabama constitutional mandate. However, this 
analysis may not necessarily be controlling after the equity 
funding cases of the late 1990s.65 
C. Constitutional Amendment: An Attempt at Avoiding Racial 
Integration 
In order to avoid the mandate of public school integration 
as dictated by the federal government,66 and in order to clarifY 
any ambiguity about whether the Alabama Constitution 
provides for a right to public education, Section 256 was 
amended in 1956 by Amendment 111, which states in pertinent 
part, 
It is the policy of the state of Alabama to foster and 
promote the education of its citizens in a manner and 
extent consistent with its available resources, and the 
willingness and ability of the individual student, but 
nothing in this Constitution shall be construed as 
creating or recognizing any right to education or 
training at public expense, nor as limiting the authority 
and duty of the legislature, in furthering or providing 
for education, to require or impose conditions or 
62. /d. 
63. 143 S.2d 629 (Ala. 1962). 
64. Id. at 630. However, even though the court held that section 256 did not 
mandate a system of free education, if such education is provided, every child should be 
allowed participation in it. /d. 
65. See Section III-D, infra. 
66. See generally Brown v. Ed. of Educ., 34 7 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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procedures deemed necessary to the preservation of 
peace and order.67 
It is clear from the legislative history of Amendment 111 
that the purpose of the amendment was to avoid court ordered 
integration.68 Thus, Amendment 111 effectuated the desires of 
the voting majority in Alabama of the 1950s to prevent forced 
integration of the existing public school system, 69 and this 
amendment, in turn, affirmed the early common law 
interpreting Section 256. However, as noted previously, this is 
not where the analysis ends because many years of progressive 
political and social change have occurred in Alabama since 
1956, rendering Amendment 111 a mere relic of past desires for 
public education for the children of Alabama no longer to be 
tolerated under current social norms. 
D. The Equity Funding Cases: New Life for a Free System of 
Public Education? 
1. Trial Court Sets the Standard 
Almost forty years after the passage of Amendment 111, a 
challenge was made in the Circuit Court of Montgomery 
County to the then existing public school funding program 
enacted by the legislature in what has become commonly called 
the "Alabama equity funding case."70 In Alabama Coalition for 
Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, 71 plaintiffs brought suit against the state 
of Alabama claiming that the existing system of public 
elementary and secondary education was neither equitable nor 
adequate and sought a declaratory judgment to that effect. 72 
67. Ala. Const. amend. 111 (amending Ala. Const. art. XIV, § 256) (emphasis 
added). 
68. See Murphy, supra n. 46, at 64-73. 
69. Over forty years after the passage of Amendment 111, Justice Houston, in his 
concurring opinion in the equity funding cases, discussed whether the court in that 
litigation had subject matter jurisdiction. In arguing in the negative, Justice Houston 
stated that "Amendment 111 ... merely authorizes certain legislative activities and 
requires or precludes virtually none." Ex Parte James, 2002 Ala. LEXIS 166, :~9 (Ala. 
2002). 
70. A full discussion of the equity funding cases is well beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, a brief mention of the outcome of the litigation is important, 
nonetheless. 
71. 1993 WL 204083 (Ala. Cir. 1993). 
72. Pinto v. Alabama Coalition for Equity, 662 S.2d 894, 895 (Ala. 1995) (quoting 
Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 S.2d 107 (Ala. 1993)). '!'he basis for the plaintiffs' 
739] ANOTHER PLAYER ON A CROWDED FIELD 755 
After class certification, the trial court bifurcated the bench 
trial into two components-the liability phase and the remedy 
phase. 73 With respect to the liability phase of the suit, the trial 
court entered a judgment on March 31, 1993, stating m 
pertinent part, that 
Alabama school aged children, including children with 
disabilities, have and enjoy a constitutional right to 
attend school in a liberal system of public schools, 
established, organized and maintained by the state, 
which shall provide all such schoolchildren with 
substantially equitable and adequate educational 
opportunities; That the essential principles and features 
of the "liberal system of public schools" required by the 
Alabama Constitution include the following: (a) It is the 
responsibility of the state to establish, organize, and 
maintain the system of public schools; (b) the system of 
public schools shall extend throughout the state; (c) the 
public schools must be free and open to all 
schoolchildren on equal terms. . . . That the present 
system of public schools in Alabama violates the 
aforestated constitutional and statutory rights of 
plaintiffs; That the state officers charged by law with 
responsibility for the Alabama public school system, are 
hereby enjoined to establish, organize and maintain a 
system of public schools .... 74 
In addition to holding that the then present system was 
inadequate and inequitable under the laws of Alabama75 and 
requiring the state to comply with the law, the court also 
provided a list of what it considered to be the essential 
components of an adequate public education system.76 Further, 
in a rather bold move, 77 the trial court unilaterally declared 
suit rested, in part, on their claim that they were denied equal protection under the 
law. Much debate, and thus, much confusion, has resulted from the question of 
whether the 1901 Constitution contains an equal protection clause. See Albert P. 
Brewer and Robert R. Maddox, Equal Protection Under the Alabama Constitution, 53 
Ala. L. Rev. 31 (2001) (examining the status of equal protection under the Alabama 
Constitution). 
73. Pinto, 662 S.2d at 895. 
74. Opinion of the Justices No . .'J38, 624 S.2d at 165-66. 
75. See Editor, Alabama School Financing Not Equitable, Judge Rules, L.A. 
Times A7 (Apr. 4, 1993). 
76. Opinion of the Justices No . .'J.'J8, 624 S.2d at 166. As discussed below, this list 
is extremely important to the instant issue of whether pay-to-play programs are 
allowed under the laws of Alabama. 
77. Justice Houston, in a later opinion, noted his disdain for Judge Reese's action 
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that Amendment 111 was "void ab initio and in its entirety 
under the Equal Protection Clause,"78 and ordered that the 
first part of Section 256 be revived and the segregation 
language be struck. 79 Although challenged by a myriad of 
defendants and criticized by various justices,80 the Supreme 
Court of Alabama consistently upheld the order pertaining to 
the liability phase on numerous occasions81 and ultimately 
refused to reverse the order under the guise of judicial 
restraint. 82 
To that end, the result of the equity funding case that has 
outlasted several governors and remained in the Alabama 
court system for the better part of a decade83 was that every 
child in Alabama is fundamentally entitled to a free and 
equally funded public education.84 And, pursuant to Judge 
Reese's order, the Alabama legislature was required to 
effectuate the same even though the mandate of the circuit 
in a concurring opinion by stating that, "[a] trial judge elected by the majority of the 
voters in a single Alabama judicial circuit has declared a portion of the Alabama 
Constitution unconstitutional" in violation of his oath to uphold that very document. 
Ex Parte ,James, 2002 Ala. LEXIS 166 at 21-22. He also argued that, when a 
constitutional provision is repealed by amendment and the amendment is later deemed 
unconstitutional, e.g., Section 256 was reversed by Amendment Ill which was then 
held unconstitutional, the prior section is revived. !d. at 50. 
78. Order of August 13, 1991, at 2, Ala. Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, No. 
CV-90-883 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery Co., Ala.). 
79. Id. 
80. Ex parte James, 713 S.2d 869, 895-923 (Ala. 1997) (Hooper, C.J., dissenting); 
Pinto, 662 S.2d at 901-10 (Houston, J., concurring in the result). 
81. James v. Ala. Coalition for Equity, Inc., 718 S.2d 937, 943 (Ala. 1997); Ex 
parte James, 713 S.2d at 878; Pinto, 662 S.2d at 90; Opinion of the Justices No. 3.18, 
624 S.2d 107 (Ala. 1993). 
82. "[T]he Liability Order having been purportedly made 'final' by the trial court 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., and never appealed, this Court has, rightly or 
wrongly, so far refused to review the merits of the Liability Order." Ex parte .James, 
2002 Ala. LEXIS 166 at 6. 
83. "The case has been in the courts for so long that children in kindergarten 
when it was filed would have graduated this year." Bob Johnson, Legislature Made 
Responsible for Schools Remedy, Chattanooga Times/Chattanooga Free Press B6 (June 
2, 2002). 
84. "By its wholesale striking of Amendment 111, the trial court appears to have 
attempted to create a new right to public education, disregarding the expressed wishes 
of the people as set forth in Amendment Ill to the Alabama Constitution." Ex Parte 
James, 2002 Ala. LEXIS 166 at 88 (Moore, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
Commentators feel that Judge Reese's order provides for a right to a free education. 
Morgan et a!., supra n. 7, at 566 (stating that the circuit court "found that it was the 
framers' intent that [section 256] impose a mandatory duty on the state to provide the 
children of Alabama with an education at public expense."); Campbell & Nicholls, 
supra n. 7. 
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court was clearly in opposition to the earlier unequivocal case 
law rendered by the state's highest court, as discussed above. 
2. Revisiting Earlier Opinions 
The orders rendered by the trial court and many appeals to 
the Supreme Court of Alabama finally gained closure in 2002. 
In January 2002,85 after expressly finding in other written 
opinions that the 1901 Constitution does not contain an equal 
protection clause, the Supreme Court of Alabama revisited its 
1993 affirmance of the trial court's orders ex mero motu86 and 
re-opened the equity funding litigation one final time. In May 
2002, after hearing more arguments from the parties, the 
Court dismissed the remedy phase order87 of the equity funding 
85. On January 10, 2002, the Supreme Court of Alabama issued the following 
order, which says in pertinent part: 
The "Equal Protection provision" of the trial court's order dated March 
31, 1993, is predicated upon the premise that§§ 1, 6, and 22 of Article I of the 
Constitution of Alabama of 1901, combine to guarantee the citizens of 
Alabama equal protection under the law of Alabama. Opinion of the Justices 
No. 338, 624 S.2d 107, 156-61, 165 (Ala. 1993). The trial court ordered the 
state officers charged by Jaw with the responsibility for the Alabama public 
school system to provide equitable and adequate educational opportunities to 
all school-age children in accordance with the constitutional mandates of Art. 
I, §§ 1, 6, and 22. Therefore, the "Equal Protection provision" resulting from 
the combination of §§ 1, 6, and 22 is a necessary component on which all 
phases of this ongoing litigation are founded. 
In 1999, after [several of] this Court's opinions ... , this Court held that 
§§ I, 6, and 22 do not combine to provide equal protection and that the 
Constitution of Alabama of 1901 does not contain an equal-protection 
provision. Ex parte Melof, 735 S.2d 1172 (Ala. 1999). 
The parties in the above-styled cases have been notified that we have 
placed these cases on rehearing ex m.ero m.otu. 
Order of January 10, 2002, Ex parte Gov. Fob James, (Ala. 2002). 
8G. It is questionable whether the Supreme Court of Alabama had the power to 
revisit its 1993 decision over seven years after the fact. However, in opposition to this 
potential "roadblock," Justice Houston argued: 
It cannot be denied that our review of the Equity Funding Case has 
proceeded along an unusual path; however, given the highly unusual nature 
of the Equity Funding Case, that fact should be unremarkable. However, the 
fact that a court's action does not navigate a familiar course does not 
automatically indicate that the court is without authority so to navigate. 
Instead, as is true in this case, it may simply mean that unusual 
circumstances have compelled the court to exercise little-used but quite 
legitimate powers. I believe that our ,June 29, 2001, order implicates two such 
powers: our general powers of supervisory authority as the Supreme Court of 
Alabama over courts of inferior jurisdiction and our inherent appellate power 
to recall our judgements. 
Ex parte James, 2002 Ala. LEXIS 166 at 58-59 (footnote omitted). 
87. For a discussion of the liability and remedy phases of the equity funding case, 
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case as constituting a violation of the separation of powers 
clause of the Alabama Constitution, but left the liability phase 
order intact. 88 In other words, although the Court did not 
reverse the trial court's liability order, it did rule that the 
judicial branch was powerless to fashion a remedy. In arriving 
at its decision, the Court stated that, "the duty to fund 
Alabama's public schools is a duty that, for over 125 years, the 
people of this State have rested squarely upon the shoulders of 
the Legislature, [and that] it is the Legislature, not the courts, 
from which any further redress should be sought."89 Therefore, 
it is finally clear after almost five decades that Amendment 111 
no longer has any effect on the public school question, and that 
under the laws of Alabama, every child has a fundamental 
right to a public education.90 
see Ira W. Harvey, Equitable Funding for Alabama's Schools: A Summary of the 
Liability and Remedy Orders in the Case of Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc., et. al us. 
Guy Hunt and Mary Harper, et. al us. Guy Hunt, 55 Ala. Law. 354 (1994). 
88. Ex parte James, 2002 Ala. LEXIS 166. 
89. Id. at 2. The Court continued: 
With regard to the remedy, our concern is ... that the pronouncement of a 
specific remedy ''from the bench" would necessarily represent an exercise of 
the power of that branch of government charged by the people of the State of 
Alabama with the sole duty to administer state funds to public schools: the 
Alabama Legislature. 
Id. at 8, id. at 87-88, 91 (Moore, C.J., concurring in the result in part, dissenting in 
part). 
90. In a press release regarding the May 31, 2002, equity funding decision, the 
Alabama Attorney General, Bill Pryor, stated: 
The Court, as I advocated, reached three conclusions: ( 1) The Court refused to 
revisit the liability order, which established that the children of Alabama 
enjoy a constitutional right to an education; (2) the Court refused the request 
of some universities to reconsider the ruling that Amendment 111, adopted in 
the 1950s to maintain segregation, violates the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution; and (3) the Court dismissed the remainder of this 
litigation on the ground that any remedy of public education funding is the 
exclusive province of the Legislature and the administration of public schools 
is the business of the State Board of Education. . . . I am pleased that the 
constitutional right of Alabama children to an education has been upheld, 
and the constitutional authority of the Legislature had the State Board of 
Education has been preserved. 
Press Release, Attorney General Bill Pryor, Statement of Attorney General Bill Pryor 
Praising the Alabama Supreme Court Ruling in Equity Funding Suit (May 31, 2002), 
(available at <http://www.ago.state.al. us/news/0531 02.htm>). 
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IV. PAY-TO-PLAY PROGRAMS IN ALABAMA 
A. Introduction 
Considering the recent developments and conclusion of the 
equity funding case, if a pay-to-play program is enacted in 
Alabama's public schools, it could be argued that charging fees 
for participation in sports and other extracurricular activities 
in Alabama's public schools would violate the newly created 
free education guarantee. This argument, lodged in other 
states, will be successful, however, only if the determination is 
first made that extracurricular activities are fundamental 
components to the proper education of the children of Alabama, 
setting them on par with classic subjects such as mathematics, 
physics, writing, and the like. If it is successfully argued that 
extracurricular activities such as football and band are 
fundamental components to a proper education, then it would 
follow that charging fees for participation would violate the 
spirit and intent of a "free" education. Such an argument, 
although not yet considered in Alabama,91 might draw its 
analysis from the courts of other states, and, if successful, will 
provide yet another wrinkle in the on-going struggle to secure 
scarce state funds for education.92 
B. Supporting a No Fee System 
1. The California Example: Hartzell v. Connell 
In 1984, the Supreme Court of California announced a 
radical change in the way education programs may be funded 
in California by holding that "the imposition of fees for 
educational extracurricular activities violates the free school 
guarantee."93 In Hartzell v. Connell, 94 the Santa Barbara High 
91. In fact, the pay-to-play issue has not been considered in any context in the 
Alabama court system, and neither has any student fee case since the new mandate of 
free public schools as determined by ,Judge Reese in the eqllity funding cases. 
92. See Editor, In Addressing Funding Issues, Montgomery Advertiser AS (Nov. 
29, 2002) (discussing the annual struggle between higher education institutions and K~ 
12 schools in Alabama). 
93. Hartzellv. Connell, 679 P.2d 35, 38 (Cal. 1981). 
94. 679 P.2d 35 (Cal. 1984). 
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School District, in the face of decreased revenue for public 
school funding, adopted a plan whereby students would be 
charged $25 for participation on each athletic team, as well as 
$25 for participation in each other extracurricular activity, 
none of which yield any credit towards graduation.95 The 
Board divided the extracurricular activities into four 
categories, including (1) dramatic productions, (2) vocal music 
groups, (3) instrumental groups, and ( 4) cheerleading groups. 96 
However, the plan did provide for a fee waiver program 
whereby students in financial need desiring to participate 
could obtain a scholarship to participate in a program requiring 
a fee. 97 In reaction to the fee plan adopted by the Board, 
plaintiffs filed suit against the Board, claiming that the plan 
violated California's free school and equal protection 
guarantees.98 
In considering the plaintiffs' claim, the court asked, "May a 
public high school district charge fees for educational programs 
simply because they have been denominated 
'extracurricular'?"99 Answering in the negative, the court first 
noted that the California Constitution mandated that the 
legislature "provide for a system of common schools by which a 
free school shall be kept up and supported m each 
district .... "100 
The court next considered two approaches discussed in 
other states. In the first approach discussed, the Hartzell court 
considered the holding from Georgia 101 that the free school 
guarantee is restricted to programs that are "essential to the 
prescribed curriculum."102 Under that view, the Hartzell court 
noted, "[T]he right to an education does not extend to activities 
that are 'outside of or in addition to the regular academic 
95. Id. at 37. Even though participation in the activity did not yield any credit 
toward graduation, such participation was linked to a for credit course in which the 
students spent time in the course preparing for the noncredit performance. ld. 
Further, each student had the "option of participating in the credit course but not the 
fee-paid performance, or vice versa." I d. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. In defining what constitutes "need," a standard similar to that used to 
qualifY for the free lunch program was used. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 36. 
100. ld. at 38 (quoting CaL Const., art. IX, § 5) (emphasis added by court). 
101. See also Paulson v. Minidoka County Sch. Dist. No. 331, 463 P.2d 935 (Idaho 
1970). 
102. Hartzell, 679 P.2d at 39 (quoting Smith v. Grim, 240 S.E.2d 884 (Ga. 1977)). 
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courses or curriculum of a school."' 103 And, under such 
reasoning, students would have no right to participate in 
extracurricular activities. 104 
The Hartzell court discussed a second approach, which 
stands for the proposition that a free school guarantee should 
"extendO to all activities which constitute an 'integral 
fundamental part of the elementary and secondary education' 
or which amount to 'necessary elements of any school's 
activity."' 105 Contrary to the first approach, this approach 
would hold that "'the right to attend school includes the right to 
participate in extracurricular activities."' 106 
The Hartzell court then discussed the history of the free 
school guarantee in California and its importance to a 
democratic form of government and concluded that "[i]t can no 
longer be denied that extracurricular activities constitute an 
integral component of public education,"107 and that such 
activities are "[no] less fitted for the ultimate purpose of our 
public schools, to wit, the making of good citizens physically, 
mentally, and morally, than the study of algebra and 
Latin .... "'108 Thus, the court held that "all educational 
activities--curricular or 'extracurricular'-{)ffered to students 
by school districts fall within the free school guarantee .... "109 
In its conclusion, the Hartzell court dismissed the school 
board's argument that the fee waiver provision of its plan 
satisfied the free school guarantee: 
The free school guarantee reflects the people's judgment 
that a child's public education is too important to be left 
to the budgetary circumstances and decisions of 
individual families. It makes no distinction between 
103. /d. (quoting Paulson, 463 P.2d 935). 
104. Id. (citing Granger v. Cascade County Sch. Dist., 499 P.2d 780 (Mont. 1972)). 
105. Id. (quoting Bond v. Ann Arbor Sch. Dist., 178 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. 1970)). 
106. Hartzell, 679 P.2d at 39 (quoting Moran v. Sch. Dist. #7, 350 F. Supp. 1180, 
1184 (D. Mont. 1972)). 
107. ld. at 42. 
108. ld. (quoting Alexander u. Phillips, 254 P. 1056, 1059 (Ariz. 1927)). See also 
Louis R. Kilzer, et a!., Allied Activities in the Secondary School (Harper & Bros., 
Publishers 1956); Jerry H. Robbins & Stirling B. Williams, Jr., Student Activities in the 
Innovative School 42 (Burgess Publg. Co. 1969); Robert W. Frederick, Student Activities 
in American Education 3 (Ctr. For Applied Research in Educ., Inc. 1965); Frederick C. 
Gruber & Thomas Bayard Beatty, Secondary School Activities (McGraw-Hill Book Co. 
1954); Marilyn V. Yarbrough, If You Let Me Play, 6 Marq. Sports L.J. 229 (1996) 
(discussing the importance of athletics in the development of women and girls). 
109. Hartzell, 679 P.2d at 43. 
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needy and nonneedy families. . . . The free school 
guarantee lifts budgetary decisions concerning public 
education out of the individual family setting and 
requires that such decisions be made by the community 
as a whole. Once the community has decided that a 
particular educational program is important enough to 
be offered by its public schools, a student's participation 
in that program cannot be made to depend upon his or 
her family's decision whether to pay a fee or buy a 
toaster. 110 
Important to the instant discussion, the Hartzell court 
dismissed the school board's argument that the court's holding 
would produce a disparate impact on students in different 
districts due to differences in budgetary constraints. In so 
holding, the court stated that "financial hardship is no defense 
to a violation of the free school guarantee." 111 The court also 
stated that equally accessible "public education is not 
contingent upon the inevitably fluctuating financial health of 
local school districts. A solution to those financial difficulties 
must be found elsewhere .... "112 
2. Other Authority in Support of Hartzell 
Although, to date, no other states have followed the lead set 
by California as pronounced in Ha.rtzell, some state courts 
have, at least indirectly, supported the rationale of the Hartzell 
court in holding that the place of extracurricular activities in 
education is not subordinate to classic "classroom" subject 
matter. For instance, an Ohio federal court stated that 
110. ld. at 43~44. 
111. ld. at 44. 
112. Id. This ruling, of course, offers an archetypal example of a "classification 
problem" bounded by the natural limits of budgetary constraints. Once a district 
determines that one extracurricular activity is fundamental to the proper education of 
the student body, will there result an endless struggle for the determination of what 
activity will constitute the line of demarcation worthy of school funding? In the face of 
potentially endless budgetary sparring, proponents of a school fee system might argue 
that once the courts require the schools to fund extracurricular programs, this 
classification struggle will only push the already under funded school districts in 
Alabama to the brink of bankruptcy. Opponents of a fee system might argue, in turn, 
that budgetary battles are a constant fixture in school planning, and this will be just 
another piece of that puzzle. Such opponents may further argue, like the Hartzell 
court, that funding should not dictate whether certain programs are offered. Instead, 
the need for providing certain extracurricular programs should be addressed by 
seeking school revenue via taxation (or other non-fee means). 
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"extracurricular activities are, in the best modern thinking, an 
integral and complementary part of the total school 
program."113 In similar fashion, a New Jersey court found that, 
even though extracurricular activities commonly occur outside 
of regular classes, such activities "form an integral and vital 
part of the educational program."114 
Finally, in an excellent discussion on the importance of 
school sports, the Supreme Court of Arizona outlined the 
evolution of extracurricular activities in the school setting, and 
then made an argument that athletic games promote the 
proper development of the body. First, the court noted that, 
prior to the urbanization of our nation when the country was 
still agrarian, there was no need for physical education in the 
school system because students received enough physical 
activity at home.ll5 However, the court continued, due to 
modern industrialization of our country, the need for physical 
education has become increasingly important. 116 Arguing in 
support of the importance of sports in the academic setting, the 
court then made an analogy between football and life: 
To use the one game of football as an illustration, the 
boy who makes a successful football player must 
necessarily learn self-control under the most trying 
circumstances, courage, both physical and moral, in the 
face of strong opposition, sacrifice of individual ease for 
a community purpose, teamwork to the exclusion of 
individual glorification, and above all that "die in the 
last ditch" spirit which leads a man to do for a cause 
everything that is reasonably possible, and, when that is 
done, to achieve the impossible by sheer will-power. 
The same is true to a greater or lesser degree of 
practically every athletic sport which is exhibited in a 
stadium. 117 
Therefore, even though the aforementioned cases did not deal 
directly with pay-to-play programs, the courts did amplify the 
need for, and importance of, extracurricular sports in the 
school setting. These reasons support the rationale in Hartzell. 
113. Dauis u. Meek, 311 F. Supp. 298, 301 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (citing Brown u. Rd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. at 493). 
114. Feaster v. Old Security Life Ins. Co., 209 A.2d 354, 357 (N.J. Super. L. Div. 
1965). 
115. Alexander u. Phillips, 251 P. 1056, 1058 (Ariz. 1927). 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 1059. 
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C. Opposing a No Fee System 
1. Kelley v. East Jackson Public Schools 
A few state courts have directly opposed the rationale 
adopted by the Hartzell court. For instance, in Kelley u. East 
Jackson Public Schools, 118 a Michigan court of appeals upheld a 
system whereby students were charged fees for participation in 
interscholastic athletics that were not related to any for credit 
class. 119 The court reasoned, "we do not find interscholastic 
athletics to be a necessary element of any school's activity. Nor 
can we say that these activities are an integral, fundamental 
part of the education process rising to the level that would 
require them to be provided at no cost."120 The Kelley court 
distinguished itself from the Hartzell case by holding that the 
students in the school system in question were not "arbitrarily 
prevented from participation" because no student had been 
denied access to participation due to lack of funds, which was a 
result of a fee waiver system.121 Another distinction from the 
facts of the Hartzell case is that there was no ability to earn 
any school credit in the Kelley case from participation in the 
extracurricular activities. Therefore, it could be argued that 
the Kelley decision would have been different, and more in line 
with Hartzell, if the extracurricular activities did involve some 
type of school credit and/or there was no fee waiver system. 
2. Other Authority in Support of Kelley 
In considering a program similar to a pay-to-play program, 
a decision of the Supreme Court of Idaho lends itself to the 
conclusion reached by the Kelley court. In Paulson v. Minidoka 
County School District No. 331, 122 the court considered a fee 
charged to every student for, inter alia, the funding of 
extracurricular activities. In invalidating the fee, the court 
reasoned that the problem was that the fee was "imposed 
generally on all students whether they participate in extra-
118. 372 N.W.2d 638 (Mich. App. 1985). 
119. !d. at 639. The Michigan constitutional provision in question provided that 
"[t]hc legislature shall maintain and support a system of free public elementary and 
secondary schools as defined by law." Mich. Const., art. 8, § 2 (I 963). 
120. Kelley, 372 N.W.2d at 639. 
121. !d. 
122. 463 P.2d 935 (Idaho 1970). 
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curricular activities or not" and that "[s]uch a charge 
contravenes the constitutional mandate that the school be 
free." 12a Further, the court "noted that, because social and 
extracurricular activities are not necessary elements of a high 
school career," the school would not violate the free school 
mandate by charging a fee to participating students.124 
Another case generally in support of the allowance of fees 
was delivered by the Supreme Court of Montana in Granger v. 
Cascade County School District No. 1.125 The Granger court, 
even though recognizing the importance of extracurricular 
activities to a thorough education, affirmed a program whereby 
fees were charged for participation in activities that are not 
required but optional. 126 Before making its final 
determination, however, the court stated that "mentality 
without physical well-being does not make for good 
citizenship-the good citizen, the man or woman who is of 
greatest value to the state, is the one whose every faculty is 
developed and alert." 127 The court further noted that 
"'[e]ducation may be particularly directed to either mental, 
moral, or physical powers of faculties, but in its broadest and 
best sense it embraces them all."' 128 Even in light of its 
proclamation concerning the importance of physical education 
in the school setting, the court concluded that the test for 
whether fees could be charged lies more in the determination of 
whether "a given course or activity [is] reasonably related to a 
recognized academic and educational goal of the particular 
school system."129 Accordingly, the court gave each local school 
board great deference by declaring that each board has the 
power to "define its own academic and educational goals and 
the courses and activities that will carry credit toward 
graduation within the limits provided by law."130 
123. ld. at 938. 
124. Id. 
125. 499 P.2d 780 (Mont. 1972). The Montana free school clause states in part that 
the "legislature shall provide a basic system of free quality public elementary and 
secondary schools." Mont. Const., art. X, § 1 (2002). 
126. Granger, 499 P.2d at 781. 
127. Id. at 784 (quoting McNair v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 288 P. 188 (Mont. 1930)). 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 786. 
130. Td. Thus, the court essentially declared that it would not make a blanket 
determination of whether a certain extracurricular activity was of enough importance 
to provide to it credit towards graduation, and thus, the protection of the free school 
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D. Pay-to-Play in Alabama After Equity Funding Cases 
1. Introduction 
Whether the institution of pay-to-play programs in 
Alabama public schools is in violation of the required system of 
public school education is a question suitable for legitimate 
debate. If a pay-to-play program is presented as a means of 
alternative funding amidst the current recessionary economic 
conditions, an appeal to the common law of Alabama will not 
likely be determinative of the issue. The Alabama case law 
arising prior to the equity funding case was reached under a 
different set of standards than what is required today of public 
schools. If presented with the question in yet another round of 
school funding litigation, a court may look to other states for a 
determination of whether to allow such fees. 131 However, as 
discussed previously, the interpretation of the free education 
clause of each state seems to be too state specific to be of any 
help to the Alabama courts because each state's clause was 
ratified under a different rationale from any other state. 
However, if presented with the issue at hand, the Alabama 
courts are not wanting for direction because the courts can look 
to the basic theories advanced by other states. 
The main determination for a court to potentially consider 
if a pay-to-play program is instituted and subsequently 
litigated in Alabama is whether sports and other 
extracurricular activities are fundamental and necessary 
components of a proper education. Although there is no clear 
authority in Alabama for such a proposition, 132 some direction 
may be gleaned from the liability order that survived the 
provision. This deferential treatment is consistent with the United States Supreme 
Court decision of School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 37 4 U.S. 203, 300 
(1963) (holding that curriculum determination should be left up to the school officials, 
not the courts). See also Alexander & Alexander, supra n. 29. 
131. This issue is not within the sole control of the court system. On the contrary, 
the legislature is free to pass a law outlawing such fees. Also, a future Alabama 
constitutional convention would be free to clarify the issue with the passage of a new, 
revamped education clause. 
132. In Lee v. Rd. of Educ., 283 F. Supp. 194, 197 (M.D. Ala. 1968), the court stated 
that "(I]t is without serious question that athletic programs in the various public high 
schools throughout Alabama are an integral part of the public school system in 
Alabama." However, upon further consideration of this statement within the context of 
the case, the meaning of "integral" was likely a term used to describe the pervasiveness 
of athletic programs, not their value. 
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equity funding case, in particular, the portion of the order 
setting forth an exhaustive list of the minimum requirements 
indicative of an adequate education: 
[A]dequate educational opportunities shall consist of, at 
a minimum, an education that provides students with 
opportunity to attain the following: (i) sufficient oral 
and written communication skills to function in 
Alabama, and at the national and international levels, 
in the coming years; (ii) sufficient mathematic and 
scientific skills to function in Alabama, and at the 
national and international levels, in the coming years; 
(iii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and 
political systems generally, and of the history, politics, 
and social structure of Alabama and the United States, 
specifically, to enable the student to make informed 
choices; (iv) sufficient understanding of governmental 
processes and of basic civic institutions to enable the 
student to understand and contribute to the issues that 
affect his or her community, state, and nation; (v) 
sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of principles of 
health and mental hygiene to enable the student to 
monitor and contribute to his or her own physical and 
mental well-being; (vi) sufficient understanding of the 
arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her 
cultural heritage and the cultural heritages of others; 
(vii) sufficient training, or preparation for advanced 
training, in academic or vocational skills, and sufficient 
guidance, to enable each child to choose and pursue life 
work intelligently; (viii) sufficient levels of academic or 
vocational skills to enable public school students to 
compete favorably with their counterparts in Alabama, 
in surrounding states, across the nation, and 
throughout the world, in academics or in the job market; 
and (ix) sufficient support and guidance so that every 
student feels a sense of self-worth and ability to achieve, 
and so that every student is encouraged to live up to his 
or her full human potential. 133 
From this list, it is arguable that all sports and many other 
academic programs offered by many schools today are included 
in the minimum requirements as set forth in the new standard 
of education in Alabama by the equity funding case. The 
aforementioned list could serve as a model by other states 
133. Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 S.2d at 166 (emphasis added). 
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considering the same issue. However, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of Alabama in its May 31, 2002 decision, no 
court in the state has the authority to require the state 
legislature to adhere to the list, which seemingly reduces the 
list to a mere persuasive status. 
2. Policy Arguments 
If presented with a challenge to a pay-to-play program, a 
court should be mindful of the policy arguments for and against 
the imposition of fees for extracurricular activities. Such policy 
arguments might be based on whether fees will deter 
participation by students unable or unwilling to pay the fees 
(resulting in a disparate educational experience for different 
students), whether the fees will further promote wealth-based 
inequality within the state (due to the ability to pay being 
associated with a wealth-based privilege), or whether the fees 
will have a psychological effect on students contemplating 
whether to forgo participation or accept a fee waiver (thus 
affirming that they wear a "badge of inferiority"). 134 In order to 
continue to promote a new age of equality within Alabama, the 
required policy analysis should adopt as it's underlying motto 
the goal of promoting education as a vehicle by which children 
of every race and socioeconomic background can break any 
vestiges of inferiority that the grossly outdated education laws 
of years past have striven to maintain. In doing so, the 
existence of adequate funds to provide programs that promote 
the educational opportunities of children in the state should 
not be used as a crutch to avoid taking a stand against proper 
and adequate education funding. 
3. Effects 
If a state court determines that a pay-to-play program 
violates the mandates of Alabama law, then certain results 
may follow. In the short run, the individual voters of the school 
systems of Alabama may be forced to pursue a property tax 
increase in their counties in order to provide for such programs. 
134. Johnson v. N.Y. St. Educ. Dept., 449 F.~d M71, 8Ma (~d Cir. 1971) (Kaufman, 
J., dissenting); see Patricia Jo Kendall, Public School Fees in illinois: A Re-
Examination of Constitutional and Policy Questions, 1984 U. IlL L. Rev. 99 (1984) 
(discussing in Part IV(B) various policy considerations in the appropriateness of 
allowing fees to be charged to students in public schools). 
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Alternatively, the school boards may have to seek other 
alternative funding methods in the same quest to provide for 
an "adequate education" for the children of Alabama, or in a 
more desperate attempt, declare that such programs are not 
fundamentally necessary to a proper education in their 
respective district. 185 In the long run, however, a more 
permanent solution to the problem must be sought. 186 In 
particular, a constitutional delegation might address the issue 
by inserting a requirement in the Alabama Constitution that 
mandates the legislature provide every child of this state with 
an adequate free public education. Such a provision may also 
provide the legislature with some guidance as to what 
constitutes an "adequate" education as well as how individual 
school boards might sufficiently fund local schools. If these 
actions are taken, then the future of Alabama's public 
education system and its coterminous prosperity137 will 
arguably mature from a relic of the state's past, and grow into 
a standard that will provide a populace that will lead Alabama 
toward a brighter future. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Facing an economic downturn and a resulting reduction in 
state revenues, state policy makers are in the unenviable 
position of having to allocate limited resources to almost 
limitless needs. Included in the many state and locally funded 
programs across the country are services such as police and fire 
protection, natural resource management, education, and 
countless others. Although it is difficult to develop a hierarchy 
of importance among the many expenditures that a state 
budget must accommodate, it is arguable that education should 
top the list. Democracy can survive only by means of an 
informed vote, and a truly informed voter, it follows, is one who 
135. However, this might run the risk of violating what the equity funding case 
order determined to be "adequate." 
136. Due to the order stemming from the equity funding litigation, the Alabama 
Board of Education has been making strides towards providing a more adequate public 
education system. Mark Niesse, Alabama Panel OKs Education Upgrade, Chattanooga 
Times/Chattanooga Free Press B7 (Sept. 14, 2001) ("Without knowing how much it 
would cost or where money would come from, the Alabama Board of Education on 
Thursday approved a plan to overhaul public schools as directed by a court."). 
137. See Peggy Ussery, Richardson: Education Key to Strong Economy, Dothan 
Eagle I, 6 (May 14, 2002). 
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has been educated. What constitutes an adequate education in 
today's society is a question that is debated in many circles, 
including the legal one. As the needs and resources available 
to fund public education experience the ebb and flow 
commensurate with the nation's rapidly changing society, the 
law should remain steadfast in its duty to ensure that all 
fundamental and necessary educational programs remain 
available for every student no matter the student's economic or 
social background. Concededly, extracurricular activities are 
educational programs on the margin between being necessary 
and not. Yet, school boards facing a pinch in available funds 
should be mindful of the need for extracurricular programs and 
their importance in the total development of today's student, 
and more importantly, whether instituting a pay-to-play 
program is allowed under the laws of their state. In doing so, 
school boards will help to prevent extracurricular activities 
from being the first casualty in education funding crises. 
